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Abstract: The Embedded Firm
This paper constitutes the introduction to an edited collection, THE EMBEDDED FIRM:
LABOR, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FINANCE CAPITALISM (Cambridge University Press,
2011). This book brings together contributions from law, economics, sociology and politics in
order to evaluate the effects of the shift to shareholder primacy in both the United States and the
United Kingdom, in the context of an increasingly financialized economy. Contributors include
Ruth Aguilera, William Allen, Harry Arthurs, Blanaid Clark, Mary Condon, Simon Deakin,
Sandy Jacoby, William Lazonick, Sue Konzelmann, Dalia Tsuk Mitchell, Larry Mitchell, Frank
Wilkinson, and the editors Cynthia Williams and Peer Zumbansen, among others. The book
emphasizes empirical evidence, in conjunction with theory, in conscious rejection of the oftstated view that “it takes a theory to beat a theory.” For in evaluating the empirical effects of
these decades-long trends, in light of the on-going global financial and economic crises—crises
propagated from the United States--the problems inherent in American-style corporate
governance have become manifest. Such problems do not only concern corporate governance,
since the shareholder wealth maximizing norm in the United States is embedded within
economic and political institutions stripped of many social democratic norms and policies and
with an increasing tendency towards deregulation. But the book demonstrates that the result of
shareholder primacy, in conjunction with neo-liberal economic and political norms, has been
increasing economic volatility and inequality, systemic fragility, and financial risk that is
increasingly being transferred to individuals to manage, given the collapse of many collective
bargaining agreements and collective arrangements for pensions. The congruence of theory and
evidence suggesting weaknesses in shareholder driven corporate governance as expressed in the
U.S. and U.K. give rise to questions of how policy and research can best be harnessed to develop

more stable systems of corporate governance, and how these goals may best be aligned with
government policy. Since it is naïve to think that continental European stakeholder systems, also
under pressure, could be transplanted into the United States or the United Kingdom by legislative
fiat, the book concludes with suggestions for research and policy development to address the
instabilities shareholder corporate governance systems create, while still relying upon existing
models within liberal market economies.

Keywords: Corporate governance, financial crisis, labour law, financialization, regulatory
reform
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Introduction: corporate governance
after the ‘end of history’: investigating
the new ‘great transformation’
Cynthia A. Williams and Peer Zumbansen

Over the last two decades, debates over the convergence or persistence of corporate governance systems have deeply engaged the
energies of academics, regulators and investors. These debates have
encompassed both the structural mechanisms of corporate decisionmaking, examining where decision-making authority should lie
within the company and which groups should have power, as well as
the more politically contested issue of whose interests should matter
when corporate decisions are being made. How companies are organized, and what powers their constituents have to influence the corporate enterprise – the core questions of corporate governance – in turn
influence capital markets and the investment decisions of managers
of huge pools of capital. ‘Does the country have an equity culture’
is often the question asked by investors and asset managers before
massive amounts of money are shifted into, or out of, a country at the
click of a ‘mouse’.
Debates over the convergence or persistence of corporate governance systems take place in the shadow of at least four significant trends
affecting operating companies.
First, there is increased global product market competition caused by
improvements in information technology, transportation, standardization and supply chain management. These pressures have forced companies in every economy to cut costs, innovate, adopt new business
strategies and develop new alliances. The intellectual habits of product
and process innovation have also fuelled financial innovation towards
similar goals: a search for yield and thus advantage.
Second, we see the transformation of the world’s largest corporations from primarily locally- or domestically-situated enterprises into
global networks of supply chains and corporate parent/subsidiary relationships. Such enterprises, held together by webs of contracts, law
and the interstitial glue of company history and norms, are subject to
competing demands from far-flung regulators, consumers, investors,
1
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non-governmental organizations and professionals such as lawyers,
investment bankers and accountants.
Third, undergirding these developments are dramatically increased
global capital market pressures throughout the developed and developing world. Newly-engaged market participants; new institutional
investors and large pools of investible capital; increasing numbers of
shareholders with activist agendas; and new types of nancial innovation and complex nancial engineering have accelerated the transition
from industrial to nance capitalism in developed economies. Finance
has come to be the dominant contributor to the economic output of
such advanced democracies as the United States and Britain, and is
of signi cant importance to the productive capacities of countries
throughout the world.
Fourth, these trends are situated in a broader context, which is the
emergence of the knowledge society, prompting a reconceptualization
of public and private forms of governance. Both political and ‘private’
actors such as non-governmental organizations, corporations, collectives and individuals operate under conditions of extreme uncertainty,
both in terms of procedural and institutional design as well as normative horizon. On the one hand, governments and governmental actors
have become increasingly dependent on fragmented, societal knowledge, which leads to an important recon guration of the relations
between political and civil society actors. The state, in its dependence
on constantly updated information, is at the same time implicated in
the production of that very information by creating rules and facilitating institutional growth for knowledge production and dissemination.
On the other, corporations and other societal actors face pressing governance challenges that in many ways mirror those of contemporary
political governing bodies. The dependence of management on expert
knowledge, which is generated and communicated both in and outside
of the rm, has grown in correlation with the expanding reach of business activities and their impact. With governments and corporations
as knowledge actors, producers and consumers, the pressure on law
to facilitate and to enable these processes has grown exponentially. No
longer clearly situated in an exclusively public or private sphere, ‘political’, ‘private’, corporate actors are both authors and receivers of the
rules that govern their behaviour.
Given these rapid changes in global operating conditions, it is understandable that there would be pressures on companies to adopt new
governance mechanisms in response. Lengthening supply chains,
emerging markets such as those in Eastern Europe, Latin America and
China becoming part of global production, and increased competition
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all require different managerial arrangements within the rm, at the
least. And yet, we argue, the speci c pressures to adopt corporate
governance systems that prioritize shareholders’ interests – pressures
particularly salient in Europe – were as much a product of political
ideology as changing economic requirements. In the enclosed chapters
we examine those pressures and their effects, both within rms and
within societies, evaluating the results of shareholder primacy in light
of increasing nancialization not only as a matter of theory, but also as
a matter of fact.
Thematic overview
The following collection addresses, from a historical and comparative
perspective, the changing regulatory landscape for business corporations and nancial institutions which has evolved in light of the increasing globalization of the markets and ‘ nancialization’ of economies.
Taking their cue from political economy studies of national varieties of
market regulation, going back to Karl Polanyi and Andrew Shon eld,
the contributing authors explore the effect of integrating markets
and converging policy strategies on corporate governance, nance
and labour market regulation. The collection brings together authors
from law, economics, sociology and political science from both North
America and Europe to study the evolution of corporate, nancial and
labor regulation against the background of the continuing global economic – and regulatory – crisis.
Inspired by Sanford Jacoby’s book The Embedded Corporation,1 and
by institutional and political economy accounts of corporate governance complementarities, the collected chapters bring a number of disciplinary perspectives to bear to the study of the regulatory evolution
and relationship between rms, nance and labour in the transformation from industrial to nance capitalism. Part I of the book traces
and evaluates this transformation, connecting it to the nancial crisis
that erupted in 2007. Contributions from Simon Deakin and Larry
Mitchell provide a theoretical and historical framework for the book
as a whole, discussing, respectively, the shift to shareholder primacy
and the transformation to nance capitalism in the United States
and United Kingdom. Contributions from William Allen, former
Chancellor of the Chancery Court in Delaware, and historian Dalia
Tsuk Mitchell analyse some of the implications of this transformation
1

Sanford Jacoby, The Embedded Corporation (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
2005).

4

C.A. Williams and P. Zumbansen

to nance capitalism on operating companies and their boards of directors, showing the political, historical and sociological forces as work.
Fenner Stewart locates these developments within the theoretical
debates of leading corporate law scholars today, while Peer Zumbansen
provides a broader framework to evaluate the challenges facing both
companies and governments within the global knowledge society.
Zumbansen’s chapter places Polanyi’s work on embedded capitalism in
the current context of both an intensi ed process of Europeanization
and a global search for regulatory remedies against the dramatic market failures since 2007.
Part II looks more speci cally at particular amalgamations of nancial power that have formed as the transformation to nance capitalism gathered momentum; particular (and particularly destabilizing)
nancial instruments; and important regulatory and policy developments in Europe and within international nancial institutions such
as the World Bank as pressures mounted to adopt more shareholder
friendly corporate governance systems. Stephen Diamond, a contrarian on the nancialization theme, nonetheless evaluates and highlights the growing in uence of private equity investors and hedge
funds in the US market. Simon Archer traces changes in the composition, sources of funding and actions within the capital markets of the
largest public pension funds in Canada, using that case study as a lens
through which to scruitinize the economic role of public pension funds
more generally. Janis Sarra discusses credit default swaps and analyses their destabilizing in uence on both nancial markets and bankruptcy proceedings, providing speci c policy advice for regulators to
use to address the problems these instruments have caused. Blainaid
Clarke’s contribution discusses the highly-contested European
Takeover Directive, in which the European stakeholder vision of the
corporation was supplanted by shareholder-centric rights and pride
of place. Her chapter also shows how the political compromises in
the Takeover Directive actually operate simultaneously to resist that
shareholder perspective. Ruth Aguilera and Cynthia Williams critically evaluate the shareholder bias of noted nance theorists, Rafael
La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer and Robert
Vishny [commonly referred to as ‘LLSV’] from the perspective of
economic sociology, while recognizing the important in uence on
policy LLSV’s theories have had at the World Bank. Collectively
these authors bring a legal and political economy perspective to bear
to carve out the implications of each of these developments for the balance of power within the rm and for the distributions of wealth and
risk within developed economies.

Introduction

5

There are a number of themes that emerge as we look at the transformation to nance capitalism in Parts I and II. One, which is not
unexpected, is that within their different corporate governance structures, labour interests in Europe, the United Kingdom, the United
States and Canada have responded to the shift towards nance capitalism in ways characteristic of their home countries’ underlying political theories, alliances and power relationships. Thus, labour unions
in the United States and Canada have used their pension capital as
shareholder activists to advance the interests of their members by using
their shareholder voting power, seeking transparency of voting records
by their asset managers; board accountability through changes in voting rules; and involvement in limiting executive compensation through
the use of shareholder proxy proposals. In these activist uses of pension fund voting power, the expressed corporate governance agenda of
labour shareholders has little differed from the corporate governance
agenda of shareholder activists generally, including promoting changes
in companies’ organizing documents that allow the market for corporate
control to ourish. Indeed, in an irony little noted in the academic literature (but discussed by Jacoby in this collection), in the United States
labour corporate governance activists have been shareholders most
consistent advocate. In Europe, labour has used their more integrated
political position as recognized social partners to resist efforts to dismantle works councils and co-determination, but have also responded
pragmatically in some cases, such as in Germany, as the economic
bargains of the post-war era came under increasing pressure from the
demands of nance capitalism. In Part III contributions from Harry
Arthurs and Claire Mummé discuss these differing uses of labour’s
shareholding power in North America and Europe, using a political
economy analysis, while economist John Evans evaluates labour’s voice
in international public policy by examining the Trade Union’s Advisory
Council’s position within the OECD.
One of the clearest implications of the shift to nance capitalism has
been a corollary insistence that the interests of shareholders should
predominate in both corporate governance theory and capital market
regulation. A second theme of the book is that the underlying premise
asserted in favour of the shareholder model of corporate governance,
that such a shift would enhance social welfare, has not been proven.
American legal academics Henry Hansmann of Yale University and
Reinier Kraakman of Harvard University have been among the most
succinct advocates for the view that there will be (and should be) convergence on the shareholder model of corporate governance, as argued
in their iconic article from 2001, ‘The End of History for Corporate
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Law’.2 In that article they posited that shareholder wealth maximizing views of the corporate governance relationship would ultimately
predominate throughout the world, by virtue of ‘the force of logic,
the force of example, and the force of competition’.3 As they put the
argument in its strongest form, ‘[t]he point is simply that now, as a
consequence of both logic and experience, there is convergence on a
consensus that the best means to this end – the pursuit of aggregate
social welfare – is to make corporate managers strongly accountable to
shareholder interests and (at least in direct terms) only to those interests’.4 Yet, the premise that shareholder capitalism enhances social
welfare has not been seriously examined as an empirical matter by
leading corporate law scholars in the United States. Rather, it has
been accepted as an article of faith or has been demonstrated by virtue
of high share prices.
In Parts III and IV the premise that shareholder capitalism enhances
social welfare is, thus, examined empirically, and is found to be unsupported by the evidence. Contributions by leading labour scholars
Sanford Jacoby and Harry Arthurs; by industrial relations economists
Suzanne Konzelmann and Frank Wilkinson; and by labour economists
William Lazonick and John Evans collectively show that pride of place
to nance is correlated with increased economic insecurity and inequality; that shareholder capitalism is inconsistent with highly-productive
industrial relations; and that investors’ short-term demands, ltered
through the stock market or through concentrated pools of investment
capital, have often undermined companies’ long-term planning and
investments in research and development to meet future strategic and
social challenges. While the Anglo-American venture capital markets
permit rapid innovation, the pressures of nance, within shareholder
wealth maximizing corporate governance norms, do not produce

2

3
4

Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman, ‘The End of History for Corporate Law’
(2001) 89 Georgetown Law Journal 439 (‘End of History I’). Hansmann and Kraakman
further elaborate in a related article, also entitled ‘The End of History for Corporate
Law’, in Jeffrey Gordon and Mark Roe (eds.), Convergence and Persistence in Corporate
Governance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004) (‘End of History II’). It
is signi cant that Hansmann and Kraakman reiterated their views of the superiority of American-style shareholder-oriented corporate governance in that collection
in 2004, notwithstanding the stock market bubble having burst in the United States,
which occurred in 2001–2002, and notwithstanding the serious weaknesses of Enron,
WorldCom and many other noted failures of corporate governance in the United Sates
during 2001–2002.
Hansmann and Kraakman, ‘End of History I’, p. 441.
Hansmann and Kraakman, ‘End of History II’, pp. 42–43.
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companies that show the same capacity for incremental innovation and
learning as do European structures.5
The third theme of this book, then, engages with the debates over
corporate governance systems. The explicit brief of many of these
debates has been to determine whether companies are more ef cient
and countries more economically successful by prioritizing the interests
of shareholders within liberal market economies, rather than balancing
the claims of a broader range of stakeholders within coordinated market
economies, using the categories introduced by Varieties of Capitalism
scholars.6 The implicit brief of these debates has challenged European
countries and rms, where successful market economies are wellestablished, to adopt Anglo-American shareholder capitalism, even as
advocates did their best to export American-style capitalism throughout the developing world. The contribution by Frank Jan De Graaf and
Cynthia Williams in Part IV examines the underlying ideological commitments of liberal market corporate governance theory, and challenges
Anglo-American theorists to think more carefully about the bene ts of
European systems, both for corporate governance arrangements and
for capital market regulation. Mary Condon’s contribution provides a
political economy explanation for international securities regulators’
attempts to have greater in uence in transnational regulatory efforts
after the global nancial crisis by strategically deploying the concept of
‘systemic risk’, but also points out regulatory and de nitional problems
this concept creates. She also develops the point that securities regulators may need to revisit long-held understandings of the purpose and
orientation of disclosure as the preferred regulatory strategy. Part IV
concludes with Keith Johnson and Frank Jan De Graaf’s recommendations for how understanding of pension funds’ duciary duties must
evolve to take account of the systemic in uence these important market
actors now have.
Theoretical perspectives
As a general matter, the contributors to this book suggest that what
could seem to be politically neutral or merely technical debates about
the best systems of corporate governance as a means to the end of
creating ef cient, well-run companies and economically successful
5
6

Jacoby, Embedded Corporation, p. 19.
Peter Hall and David Soskice (eds.), Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations
of Comparative Advantage (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).
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countries are masking, in fact, serious ideological disagreements. This
observation should hardly be surprising, and indeed has been the basis
for a respected analysis for why European countries have so far failed
to create deep, liquid capital markets.7 Nor should the resistance of
countries encompassing stakeholder governance systems towards
Anglo-American shareholder governance systems be surprising.
Inspired by Karl Polanyi and Mark Granovetter as well as by the more
recent revival of economic sociology, spearheaded by scholars such as
Richard Swedberg and Jens Beckert, we nd that two fundamental
dynamics might well explain the persistence of corporate governance
systems: the embedded nature of companies, corporate governance systems, and markets, as theorized by Granovetter; and the ‘double movement’ of market liberalization and resistance, as theorized by Polanyi,
who himself is regularly associated with designing a theory of embedded capitalism.
In his article ‘Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem
of Embeddedness’,8 Mark Granovetter brought a sociological and institutional perspective to bear on a fundamental observation: that markets
are embedded within the social and political systems in which they arise.
Thus, markets cannot be considered free-standing institutions outside
of a society, as the ‘free market’ often had been, and still is in some contexts. Rather ‘the market’ must be understood as an embedded institution that manifests the social and political values of the society in which
it is embedded, including the professional and transnational networks
that affect the market, even as it develops its own logic and values. One
implication of this view is that corporate governance reforms cannot
be considered in isolation from a thorough understanding of the social
and cultural context in which companies arise, and in conjunction with
a thorough understanding of the complementarities between companies, corporate governance systems, and the political and institutional
frameworks in which companies operate. Since stakeholder corporate
governance systems are consistent with the social democratic traditions
in the countries in which they’ve arisen – primarily in Northern and
Central Europe, but also to some extent in Japan – it would be naïve
to expect they would converge to Anglo-American shareholder capitalism smoothly. Even in the face of global product market competition
and institutional investor pressure that will in theory privilege the most
7

8

Mark Roe, ‘Modern Politics and Ownership Separation’, in Gordon and Roe,
Convergence and Persistence, pp. 252–290.
Mark Granovetter, ‘Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of
Embeddedness’ (1985) 91 American Journal of Sociology 481–510.
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ef cient system of corporate organization9 – believed by many American
law professors to be theirs10 – one would expect exactly the persistence
of stakeholder systems that is observed, albeit under pressure.
Indeed, Karl Polanyi’s work from 1944 on the double movement of
market liberalization and resistance predicts this persistence. In The
Great Transformation Polanyi argued that as markets expand, so do their
undesirable side-effects: instability, monopoly and negative externalities, for instance, and that these side-effects cannot be solved by the
market itself. Rather, market expansions are followed by social resistance to ‘the pernicious effects of a market-controlled economy’. Polanyi
called this the double movement: ‘[T]he action of two organizing principles in society … economic liberalism, aiming at the establishment of
a self-regulating market … [and] the other was the principle of social
protection aiming at the conservation of man and nature as well as productive organization.’11
The theme of the ‘embedded rm’ that lies at the core of this volume thus reaches back to a signi cant return of economic sociology since
the 1980s, notably inspired by Granovetter’s seminal article.12 The signi cance of this reorientation in research lies in its distinct interdisciplinarity. In contrast to the rise in importance of economics in various
elds in law, particularly tort, contract, property and corporate law,13
the emerging eld of economic sociology brings together administrative and regulatory studies in the tradition of Max Weber with scholarship in institutional and new institutional economics, such as that by
Ronald Coase, Douglass North and Oliver Williamson.14 Furthering and
9

10

11

12
13

14

A number of academics have recognized that there can be different ways to organize
ef cient corporate organizations, and that there can be comparative economic advantage to different corporate governance systems. Jacoby, Embedded Corporation, pp.
170–171: ‘The Japanese corporate system – governance, strategy, HR, and much
besides – facilitates organizational learning and allows companies to specialize in
products and processes that are dif cult for other companies to imitate. By contrast,
the U.S. emphases on exibility and mobility require general, not rm-speci c, skills
to facilitate rapid allocation of resources to emergent industries.’ Jeffrey Gordon and
Mark Roe, ‘Introduction’, in Gordon and Roe, Convergence and Persistence, p. 5 (recognizing the possibility of various paths to ef cient corporate organizations).
Hansmann and Kraakman, ‘End of History I’, p. 441; Hansmann and Kraakman,
‘End of History II’, pp. 46–48.
Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time
(New York: Farrar & Rinehart, 1944), p. 132.
Granovetter, ‘Economic Action and Social Structure’.
See generally Richard Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (Boston: Little Brown, 1973),
and subsequent editions; Robert Cooter and Thomas Ulen, Law & Economics, 4th
edn (Boston: Pearson, 2004).
Richard Swedberg, ‘The Economic Sociology of Capitalism: An Introduction and
Agenda’, in Victor Nee and Richard Swedberg (eds.), The Economic Sociology of
Capitalism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005).
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expanding the investigative scope of the law and economics agenda, economic sociology has contributed to an increasingly ambitious intellectual
discourse about how to organize, govern and regulate corporations across
societies.15 We recognize this to be another illustration of an encompassing trend towards ‘governance studies’, which often have their starting
point within the framework of a particular discipline but which unfold in
an inherently border-crossing manner, drawing on a wealth of different
disciplinary perspectives, theoretical foundations and empirical data.16
Re ecting on this context, much of the scholarship on comparative corporate governance has been dominated by a law and economics perspective.17 Two volumes, one edited by John Armour and Joseph McCahery,18
and the other edited by Jeffrey Gordon and Mark Roe,19 have attracted
considerable attention in enlarging the perspectives on the vivid debate
over ‘convergence’ or ‘divergence’ in corporate governance principles.
Central to all of these volumes, however, is a signi cantly biased perspective from which the policy and regulatory changes within differently
observed countries are studied primarily with view to a very small set
of established principles of economically theorized, allegedly technical
or, ‘good’ corporate governance, including enhanced investor protection, capital markets disclosure as a primary regulatory mechanism, an
absence of employee co-determination and a reduced interventionist role
of the state. This credo is signi cantly captured in two landmark monographs, one by Mark Roe from 2003, and one from Kraakman et al. in
2004, that each received both explicit praise and criticism.20
15

16

17

18

19
20

Ruth V. Aguilera and Gregory Jackson, ‘International and Comparative Corporate
Governance’ (2010) 4 Academy of M anagement Annals 485–556.
Peer Zumbansen, ‘The Conundrum of Order. The Concept of Governance from an
Interdisciplinary Perspective’, in David Levi-Faur (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of
Governance (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011 forthcoming).
See here, above all the following volumes: Klaus J. Hopt, Hideki Kanda, Mark Roe,
Eddy Wymeersch and Stefan Prigge (eds.), Comparative Corporate Governance. The
State of the Art and Emerging Research (Oxford and New York: Oxford University
Press, 1998); Klaus Gugler (ed.), Corporate Governance and Economic Performance
(Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2001); Joseph A. McCahery, Piet
Moerland, Theo Raaijmakers and Luc Renneboog (eds.), Corporate Governance
Regimes. Convergence and Diversity (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press,
2002); Klaus J. Hopt and Eddy Wymeersch (eds.), Capital M arkets and Company L aw
(Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2003); Klaus J. Hopt et al. (eds.),
Corporate Governance in Context. Corporations, States and M arkets in Europe, Japan and
the US (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2005).
John Armour and Joseph McCahery (eds.), After Enron. I mproving Corporate L aw and
M odernising Securities Regulation in Europe and the US (Oxford and Portland: Hart
Publishing, 2006).
Gordon and Roe, Convergence and Persistence.
Mark Roe, Political Determinants of Corporate Governance (Oxford and New
York: Oxford University Press, 2003); evaluated in Peter Gourevitch, ‘The Politics
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At the same time, the economic sociology camp has been extremely
proli c: led by thinkers such as Wolfgang Streeck at the Max Planck
Institute for the Study of Societies in Cologne, Germany, 21 and by comparative political economists such as Peter Hall and David Soskice, this
eld has produced an impressive number of critiques of the ‘convergence advocates’, convincingly arguing for a more layered perspective
on the different dynamics of institutional change with regard to pathdependent, historically evolved corporate governance regimes.22 This
work has been published in the intellectually rich context of a renewed
interest in the ‘embeddedness of market institutions’, as originally
spearheaded by Karl Polanyi,23 revived by Granovetter (1985),24 before
receiving more attention from sociologists and political economists in
a volume edited by Rogers Hollingsworth and Robert Boyer25 as well
as by scholars such as Neil Fligstein.26 Related works in this regard
have focused on the case of Europe in particular, providing important
comparative insights on the different conditions of institutional change
and regulatory responses in countries adapting to globally integrated
markets, for goods, services, capital and people.27
Our collection brings together a diverse group of contributors to
challenge the premises of the law and economics perspective with the
insights of labour law scholars, economic sociologists and stakeholder
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of Corporate Governance Regulation’ (2003) 112 Yale Law Journal 1829–1880;
Reinier Kraakman, Paul Davies, Henry Hansmann, Gerard Hertig, Klaus Hopt,
Hideki Kanda and Edward Rock, The Anatomy of Corporate Law. A Comparative and
Functional Approach (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2004); discussed in David A. Skeel Jr., ‘Corporate Anatomy Lessons’ (2004) 113 Yale Law
Journal 1519–1577.
Wolfgang Streeck, Reforming Capitalism. Institutional Change in the German Political
Economy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).
Wolfgang Streeck, ‘German Capitalism: Does It Exist? Can It Survive?’, in Colin
Crouch and Wolfgang Streeck (eds.), Political Economy of Modern Capitalism
(London: Sage, 1997); Wolfgang Streeck and Kozo Yamamura (eds.), The Origins
of Nonliberal Capitalism in Germany and Japan: Cornell Studies in Political Economy
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001); Hall and Soskice, Varieties of Capitalism.
Polanyi, The Great Transformation.
See also Mark Granovetter, ‘The Impact of Social Structure on Economic Outcomes’
(2005) 19 Journal of Economic Perspectives 33–50.
J. Rogers Hollingsworth, ‘Continuities and Changes in the Social Systems of
Production: The Cases of Japan, Germany, and the United States’, in J. Rogers
Hollingsworth and Robert Boyer (eds.), Contemporary Capitalism. The Embeddedness
of Institutions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
Neil Fligstein, The Architecture of Markets. An Economic Sociology of Twenty-First
Century Capitalist Societies (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001).
Steven Weber (ed.), Globalization and the European Political Economy (New
York: Columbia University Press, 2001); Jonathan Zeitlin and David Trubek (eds.),
Governing Work and Welfare in a New Economy: European and American Experiments
(Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2003).
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governance experts. Building on the past twenty- ve years of intensive
research in the noted elds, the contributors to this volume integrate
work done in comparative law, new institutional economics, comparative political economy, regulatory theory, economic sociology and
social norms theory in a serious manner. There is no question for these
authors that the regulatory landscape of corporate and nancial regulation has changed dramatically in an era of post-welfare state market
intervention, marked by indirect regulation, soft law and delegation on
the one hand and a dramatically integrated global market on the other.
Yet the current challenges of the global nancial crisis give pause, and
call for a re-examination of the premises upon which capital market
deregulation and the shareholder primacy viewpoint were based.
In this volume, the contributing authors engage with the concept
of ‘embeddedness’ in a context, where the mainstream view – until
very recently – sternly defended the demise of effective governmental
interventions into market relations. At the present time, the renewed
interest in political economy, and the varied histories of regulation and
the notion of embedded institutions, re ects on a wide-reaching awareness of the importance of reassessing the foundations of institutional
change.
Conclusion
Written as the nancial and economic crises since 2007 continue to
destabilize economies around the world, the social vulnerabilities that
have been created by the shift in corporate priorities over the past
three decades to short-term shareholders’ interests are tragically evident. What is less evident is the way forward, from both a theoretical
and policy perspective. Studying the trajectory of the past, in careful
detail; developing an analysis of the pressures of nance capitalism and
implications of those pressures; and examining views of the rm with a
broader perspective on the interests to be considered, while attending
to the conditions necessary for institutional learning, is the task we’ve
set for ourselves. We bring together the enclosed chapters to challenge,
to inspire discussion, and to suggest ideas for that way forward, a way
that we suggest must better accommodate broader societal interests
within the nancial Prometheus that concentrated capital and nancial
innovation have unbound.

Part I

H istorical trajectories of business
and regulation
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In this book we’ve brought together contributions from law, economics, sociology and politics in order to evaluate the effects of the shift
to shareholder primacy in both the United States and the United
Kingdom, in the context of a parallel shift in both countries to an economy in which nance has an increasingly central role. We have made
a decision to include and even emphasize empirical evidence, rather
than theory alone, in conscious rejection of the oft-stated view that
“it takes a theory to beat a theory.” For in evaluating the empirical
effects of these decades-long trends in light of the global nancial and
economic crises – crises propagated from the United States – we submit that the problems inherent in American-style corporate governance
have become manifest. The problem is not only one of corporate governance, since the shareholder wealth maximizing norm in the United
States is embedded within economic and political institutions stripped
of many social democratic norms and policies. But in conjunction with
neoliberal economic and political norms, the result of shareholder primacy has been increasing economic volatility and inequality, systemic
fragility and nancial risk that is increasingly being transferred to individuals to manage, particularly given the collapse of many collective
bargaining agreements and collective arrangements for pensions.
The congruence of theory and evidence suggesting weaknesses in
shareholder driven corporate governance gives rise to questions about
what, instead, the goals of corporate governance should be, and how
these goals may best be aligned with government policy. It is naïve to
think that continental European stakeholder systems could be transplanted into the United States or the United Kingdom by legislative
at. As the convergence debate has shown, corporate governance systems are sticky, being deeply embedded in complementary institutional
frameworks, political constellations and social norms. Certainly aspects
of stakeholder arrangements ought to be studied seriously and mined
for their inherent values or regulatory approaches that could inform
speci c policy recommendations. But the embedded nature of rms
477
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and corporate governance arrangements does suggest caution, and
encourages ever more serious, open-minded study in search of policy
ideas. T he following paragraphs seek to provide some ideas about what
topics seem worthy of that further research.
First, as emphasized in a number of chapters, there are examples
of both economically liberal economies such as Australia and Canada,
and coordinated market economies such as Austria, Belgium, Finland,
Germany, N orway and the N etherlands, that have either weathered the
global nancial crisis relatively unscathed, or have shown better economic performance than the United States and the United K ingdom
over the last decades. (Chapter 13 is particularly instructive on these
points, but see also Chapters 12 and 18.) Scandinavian corporate governance systems, as such, are worthy of greater study, having been relatively ignored in many comparative or international evaluations. M ore
generally, evidence-based comparative study of the combinations of
corporate governance, government policy and social norms to which
these successes are owed would no doubt yield important insights.
One promising approach to developing corporate governance thinking that builds on the Varieties of Capitalism intellectual tradition
is to more closely examine varieties of liberalism, as has been done
recently by K onzelmann, Fovargue-D avies and Schnyder.1 T heir paper
addresses the question of why Australian and Canadian banks fared so
much better in the global nancial crisis than did American and British
banks, even though all four countries share an English common-law
heritage and are market oriented economies. I n addition to various
government policies that did not permit imprudent mortgage lending
or excessive leverage within nancial institutions, the authors point to
variations among the type of economic liberalism informing policy generally in Australia and Canada versus the United States and the United
K ingdom. T hey construe Australian and Canadian economic policy
as a variation of “ ordoliberalism,” an approach to economic regulation
developed by the German Freiburg school of economists in the early
decades of the twentieth century. T his school of thought encourages a
more active role for government than does laissez-faire liberalism, particularly with respect to inequalities or abuses of power among market
actors. N ot only is this economic theory worth further exploration and
development and has, thus, been attracting attention well beyond the
longstanding efforts to conceptualize European legal harmonization,
1

S. K onzelmann, M . Fovargue-D avies and G. Schnyder, “ Varieties of L iberalism”
(2010), Centre for Business Research, U niversit y of Cambridge, Working Paper N o.
403, available at” www.cbr.cam.ac.uk/pdf/W P403.pdf.
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but the concept of “ varieties of liberalism” is an important one for identifying further research trajectories, even as the speci cs of banking
(and pension) regulation in Canada and Australia are worthy of further
examination.
Second, several of the market developments exposed in the nancial
crisis and discussed in this book give rise to further research questions
and need for policy development. One, certainly, is the “ systemic risk”
concern identi ed in Chapter 19, particularly in conjunction with the
derivatives market discussed by Sarra in Chapter 10. Various domestic
regulators and transnational regulatory bodies have been grappling with
the implications of this challenge, giving rise to a series of questions.
“ W hat is systemic risk? H ow is it created? H ow can it be addressed?” is
just the beginning of questions that need attention. M ore fundamental, we need to ask whether we have reached a level of nancial complexity that is excessive, that is beyond the capacity of nancial market
participants themselves or regulators to understand and regulate. I s it
simply a matter of distributed knowledge that needs to be mined more
effectively by global regulatory “ colleges” using better computers, or
is there a limit to the types and number of derivative transactions that
can be managed effectively in a world of hyper-connectivity and hyperspeed?
Research on systemic risk illustrates the intricate nature of this category of risk, something which is increasingly re ected, on the one
hand, in interdisciplinary investigations on the constituting elements
that make up systemic risk and, on the other, in an earnest revival of
political economy and economic sociology work, as indicated in our
introduction to this collection. A de ning trait of this development is
the distinct recognition that a better understanding of systemic risk is
going to depend in a crucial manner on conceiving of it as a matter of
comprehensive social theory, e.g. “ governance,” rather than through
this or that economistic “ model.” Seen through this lens, the attention attracted by “ systemic risk” is ample evidence of a decisive turn to
social theory, conducted in an interdisciplinary manner.
M eanwhile, the crucial role of transparency and of “ governance
by disclosure” is increasingly seen as central to present debates over
“ good” corporate governance. T his is nowhere felt more strongly than
in the eld of securities regulation, an area that in many liberal economies has relied primarily on disclosure of rm-speci c information
as the regulatory approach, connecting to views of well-informed,
individual rational actors making economically intelligent investment
decisions, with the assumption that this is the best way to promote
allocational ef ciency. Each of these premises is open to question in
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a world of systemic complexity and multiple redistributions of risk. As
discussed in a number of chapters (and even by some regulators), 2 the
premises of market ef ciency, individual rationality leading to market
rationality, allocational ef ciency through capital markets, liquidity as
always bene cial, even the role of capital markets as “ capital providers
to rms,” need to be re-examined in light of the global nancial crisis
and empirical evidence of growing economic fragility, not resilience, in
the nancial system. Systems theory and chaos theory from engineering and physics are starting to be deployed to address these questions,
which is a promising development. M ore fundamental and comprehensive research into systemic risk, derivatives transactions and complexity
is still necessary, however, not only from these scienti c traditions but
also from cognitive psychology and regulatory theory.
Chapters 13, 15 and 18 also point to another complex of market developments that needs further research and more sustained policy development, and concerns the implications from trends over the last three
decades toward the ever spiraling upward distribution of compensation
within the rm, particularly within shareholder driven corporate governance systems. Executive compensation systems designed to “ align
the interests of managers with the shareholders” as one or even the
preferred solution to principal/agent problems, have exacerbated those
problems, particularly, as we’ve seen, within nancial rms. Excessive
stock option compensation and bonus-driven compensation have been
particularly pernicious in encouraging one-way bets in management’s
favor and excessive rm-level risk – risk that feeds into the systemic
risk issues discussed above. As recognized by Roger M artin, the D ean
of the Rotman School of M anagement in Toronto, Canada, executive
compensation needs to be fundamentally re-designed to actually align
the interests of management with that of the rm and its pro tability or
revenue, not its stock price.3 L azonick’s work with Glimstedt and X ie
on Swedish compensation systems provides another promising area of
comparative study,4 and there are no doubt other comparators valuable
for study and to inform more subtle, and effective, policy interventions
regarding executive compensation.
2

3

4

T he Turner Review of 2009, “ A Regulatory Response to t he Global Financial Crisis,”
Financial Services Aut horit y ( U nited K ingdom), section 1.4, available at: www.fsa.
gov.uk/pubs/ot her/turner_review.pdf.
Roger M artin, “ M anagers M ust Be Judged On T he Real Score,” Financial Times, M ay
11, 2009, p. 9.
H enrik Glimstedt, William L azonick and H ao X ie, “ T he Evolution and A llocation of
Employee Stock Options: Adapting U S-st yle Compensation to t he Swedish Business
M odel” (2006) 3 European M anagement Review 156–176.
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Much of the above seems in our view to point directly to the rm as
an entity, the organization and nature of which clearly exceeds its characterization as primarily an investment vehicle. The dramatic regulatory failure of corporate behavior which led to the crisis testi es to the
inadequacy of the dominant descriptions of the rm. As alluded to in
the introduction and spelled out in more detail in Chapter 7, there is
much to be said for an approach which places the rm in the context of
a volatile knowledge society, in which the demarcations between “public” and “private” have become porous and regulatory programs are
faced increasingly with the challenge of dealing with constellations of
extreme uncertainty. Such uncertainty pertains to the design of organizational frameworks as much as to nding the correct balance between
interventionist and facilitative regulation. Uncertainty also pertains
to the normative uncertainty of what rms should be allowed to do
in a context where large portions of formerly “public” service provision, infrastructure development, nance and maintenance, as well
as research and development, have been shifted over to the “private”
sector. In this context of transformed statehood,5 we need to rethink
the fundamentals of our approaches to delineating public from private
activity.6
Parallel and partially complementing work by scholars such as
Lazonick, O’Sullivan or Zumbansen on the “learning” or the “innovative” rm, scholars such as Simon Deakin, Suzanne Konzelmann,
Sanford Jacoby, Harry Arthurs but also Paddy Ireland and John
Parkinson have been investigating, in particular, the role of the employee
within the rm. Today, the disciplinary horizon has been widened even
further. As employees within rms increasingly become critical to rms’
knowledge bearing and knowledge creating capacities, insights from
industrial and organizational psychology need to be brought to bear to
connect those important disciplines’ research with corporate governance and employment compensation design. Industrial and organizational psychology mechanisms to create high performance workplaces
and enhance the justice climates within rms are well-understood in
those disciplines, and the productivity gains of various mechanisms
supported by extensive empirical evidence from both eld and laboratory studies. This knowledge has been poorly integrated into corporate
governance thinking on executive compensation, however, and as such
provides fertile ground for interdisciplinary advance.
5
6

See the interdisciplinary research program at www.sfb597.uni-bremen.de.
For an early, provocative approach, see Bernard de Mandeville, The Fable of the Bees,
or Private Vices, Public Bene ts (1714).
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Finally, the capital market interventions of pension funds, and the
duciary duties of pension fund trustees, need further research and
careful policy consideration given the importance of these collective
welfare institutions to the health of both societies and capital markets.
As Chapters 9, 13 and 20 explore, pension funds of various kinds (public, private and/or labor-oriented) have become key market actors, owning large swathes of the market and becoming invested in every asset
class and type of nancial transaction. Given their long-term promises
to bene ciaries they ought to be the ultimate patient capitalists. D ecades
of under-funding by political actors have created acute short-term pressures, however. M oreover, pension funds interact with an entire supply
chain of advisors and asset managers whose incentives may not, and
often do not, align with the interests of the ultimate bene ciaries. T hus
many funds have become anything but patient capitalists. H ow this
situation could be addressed requires a fundamental re-evaluation of
the nature of funds’ duciary duties, recognizing that funds own the
whole market and thus need to be concerned with the health of the
whole market and the societies in which they are embedded. M oreover
the problems associated with the funds’ investment supply chain are
well understood, as Chapter 20 discusses. It is time to consider in more
detail policy solutions to address those problems. As with each of the
topics discussed here, the present collection suggests that such solutions ought to be pursued through a close dialogue between “ theory”
and “ practice.”
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In this book we’ve brought together contributions from law, economics, sociology and politics in order to evaluate the effects of the shift
to shareholder primacy in both the United States and the United
Kingdom, in the context of a parallel shift in both countries to an economy in which finance has an increasingly central role. We have made
a decision to include and even emphasize empirical evidence, rather
than theory alone, in conscious rejection of the oft-stated view that
“it takes a theory to beat a theory.” For in evaluating the empirical
effects of these decades-long trends in light of the global financial and
economic crises – crises propagated from the United States – we submit that the problems inherent in American-style corporate governance
have become manifest. The problem is not only one of corporate governance, since the shareholder wealth maximizing norm in the United
States is embedded within economic and political institutions stripped
of many social democratic norms and policies. But in conjunction with
neoliberal economic and political norms, the result of shareholder primacy has been increasing economic volatility and inequality, systemic
fragility and financial risk that is increasingly being transferred to individuals to manage, particularly given the collapse of many collective
bargaining agreements and collective arrangements for pensions.
The congruence of theory and evidence suggesting weaknesses in
shareholder driven corporate governance gives rise to questions about
what, instead, the goals of corporate governance should be, and how
these goals may best be aligned with government policy. It is naïve to
think that continental European stakeholder systems could be transplanted into the United States or the United Kingdom by legislative
fiat. As the convergence debate has shown, corporate governance systems are sticky, being deeply embedded in complementary institutional
frameworks, political constellations and social norms. Certainly aspects
of stakeholder arrangements ought to be studied seriously and mined
for their inherent values or regulatory approaches that could inform
specific policy recommendations. But the embedded nature of firms
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and corporate governance arrangements does suggest caution, and
encourages ever more serious, open-minded study in search of policy
ideas. The following paragraphs seek to provide some ideas about what
topics seem worthy of that further research.
First, as emphasized in a number of chapters, there are examples
of both economically liberal economies such as Australia and Canada,
and coordinated market economies such as Austria, Belgium, Finland,
Germany, Norway and the Netherlands, that have either weathered the
global nancial crisis relatively unscathed, or have shown better economic performance than the United States and the United Kingdom
over the last decades. (Chapter 13 is particularly instructive on these
points, but see also Chapters 12 and 18.) Scandinavian corporate governance systems, as such, are worthy of greater study, having been relatively ignored in many comparative or international evaluations. More
generally, evidence-based comparative study of the combinations of
corporate governance, government policy and social norms to which
these successes are owed would no doubt yield important insights.
One promising approach to developing corporate governance thinking that builds on the Varieties of Capitalism intellectual tradition
is to more closely examine varieties of liberalism, as has been done
recently by Konzelmann, Fovargue-Davies and Schnyder.1 Their paper
addresses the question of why Australian and Canadian banks fared so
much better in the global nancial crisis than did American and British
banks, even though all four countries share an English common-law
heritage and are market oriented economies. In addition to various
government policies that did not permit imprudent mortgage lending
or excessive leverage within nancial institutions, the authors point to
variations among the type of economic liberalism informing policy generally in Australia and Canada versus the United States and the United
Kingdom. They construe Australian and Canadian economic policy
as a variation of “ordoliberalism,” an approach to economic regulation
developed by the German Freiburg school of economists in the early
decades of the twentieth century. This school of thought encourages a
more active role for government than does laissez-faire liberalism, particularly with respect to inequalities or abuses of power among market
actors. Not only is this economic theory worth further exploration and
development and has, thus, been attracting attention well beyond the
longstanding efforts to conceptualize European legal harmonization,
1

S. Konzelmann, M. Fovargue-Davies and G. Schnyder, “Varieties of Liberalism”
(2010), Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge, Working Paper No.
403, available at” www.cbr.cam.ac.uk/pdf/WP403.pdf.
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but the concept of “varieties of liberalism” is an important one for identifying further research trajectories, even as the specifics of banking
(and pension) regulation in Canada and Australia are worthy of further
examination.
Second, several of the market developments exposed in the financial
crisis and discussed in this book give rise to further research questions
and need for policy development. One, certainly, is the “systemic risk”
concern identified in Chapter 19, particularly in conjunction with the
derivatives market discussed by Sarra in Chapter 10. Various domestic
regulators and transnational regulatory bodies have been grappling with
the implications of this challenge, giving rise to a series of questions.
“What is systemic risk? How is it created? How can it be addressed?” is
just the beginning of questions that need attention. More fundamental, we need to ask whether we have reached a level of financial complexity that is excessive, that is beyond the capacity of financial market
participants themselves or regulators to understand and regulate. Is it
simply a matter of distributed knowledge that needs to be mined more
effectively by global regulatory “colleges” using better computers, or
is there a limit to the types and number of derivative transactions that
can be managed effectively in a world of hyper-connectivity and hyperspeed?
Research on systemic risk illustrates the intricate nature of this category of risk, something which is increasingly reflected, on the one
hand, in interdisciplinary investigations on the constituting elements
that make up systemic risk and, on the other, in an earnest revival of
political economy and economic sociology work, as indicated in our
introduction to this collection. A defining trait of this development is
the distinct recognition that a better understanding of systemic risk is
going to depend in a crucial manner on conceiving of it as a matter of
comprehensive social theory, e.g. “governance,” rather than through
this or that economistic “model.” Seen through this lens, the attention attracted by “systemic risk” is ample evidence of a decisive turn to
social theory, conducted in an interdisciplinary manner.
Meanwhile, the crucial role of transparency and of “governance
by disclosure” is increasingly seen as central to present debates over
“good” corporate governance. This is nowhere felt more strongly than
in the field of securities regulation, an area that in many liberal economies has relied primarily on disclosure of firm-specific information
as the regulatory approach, connecting to views of well-informed,
individual rational actors making economically intelligent investment
decisions, with the assumption that this is the best way to promote
allocational efficiency. Each of these premises is open to question in
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a world of systemic complexity and multiple redistributions of risk. As
discussed in a number of chapters (and even by some regulators), 2 the
premises of market efficiency, individual rationality leading to market
rationality, allocational efficiency through capital markets, liquidity as
always beneficial, even the role of capital markets as “capital providers
to firms,” need to be re-examined in light of the global financial crisis
and empirical evidence of growing economic fragility, not resilience, in
the financial system. Systems theory and chaos theory from engineering and physics are starting to be deployed to address these questions,
which is a promising development. More fundamental and comprehensive research into systemic risk, derivatives transactions and complexity
is still necessary, however, not only from these scientific traditions but
also from cognitive psychology and regulatory theory.
Chapters 13, 15 and 18 also point to another complex of market developments that needs further research and more sustained policy development, and concerns the implications from trends over the last three
decades toward the ever spiraling upward distribution of compensation
within the firm, particularly within shareholder driven corporate governance systems. Executive compensation systems designed to “align
the interests of managers with the shareholders” as one or even the
preferred solution to principal/agent problems, have exacerbated those
problems, particularly, as we’ve seen, within financial firms. Excessive
stock option compensation and bonus-driven compensation have been
particularly pernicious in encouraging one-way bets in management’s
favor and excessive firm-level risk – risk that feeds into the systemic
risk issues discussed above. As recognized by Roger Martin, the Dean
of the Rotman School of Management in Toronto, Canada, executive
compensation needs to be fundamentally re-designed to actually align
the interests of management with that of the firm and its profitability or
revenue, not its stock price.3 Lazonick’s work with Glimstedt and Xie
on Swedish compensation systems provides another promising area of
comparative study,4 and there are no doubt other comparators valuable
for study and to inform more subtle, and effective, policy interventions
regarding executive compensation.
2

3
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The Turner Review of 2009, “A Regulatory Response to the Global Financial Crisis,”
Financial Services Authority (United Kingdom), section 1.4, available at: www.fsa.
gov.uk/pubs/other/turner_review.pdf.
Roger Martin, “Managers Must Be Judged On The Real Score,” Financial Times, May
11, 2009, p. 9.
Henrik Glimstedt, William Lazonick and Hao Xie, “The Evolution and Allocation of
Employee Stock Options: Adapting US-style Compensation to the Swedish Business
Model” (2006) 3 European Management Review 156–176.
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Much of the above seems in our view to point directly to the rm as
an entity, the organization and nature of which clearly exceeds its characterization as primarily an investment vehicle. The dramatic regulatory failure of corporate behavior which led to the crisis testi es to the
inadequacy of the dominant descriptions of the rm. As alluded to in
the introduction and spelled out in more detail in Chapter 7, there is
much to be said for an approach which places the rm in the context of
a volatile knowledge society, in which the demarcations between “public” and “private” have become porous and regulatory programs are
faced increasingly with the challenge of dealing with constellations of
extreme uncertainty. Such uncertainty pertains to the design of organizational frameworks as much as to nding the correct balance between
interventionist and facilitative regulation. Uncertainty also pertains
to the normative uncertainty of what rms should be allowed to do
in a context where large portions of formerly “public” service provision, infrastructure development, nance and maintenance, as well
as research and development, have been shifted over to the “private”
sector. In this context of transformed statehood,5 we need to rethink
the fundamentals of our approaches to delineating public from private
activity.6
Parallel and partially complementing work by scholars such as
Lazonick, O’Sullivan or Zumbansen on the “learning” or the “innovative” rm, scholars such as Simon Deakin, Suzanne Konzelmann,
Sanford Jacoby, Harry Arthurs but also Paddy Ireland and John
Parkinson have been investigating, in particular, the role of the employee
within the rm. Today, the disciplinary horizon has been widened even
further. As employees within rms increasingly become critical to rms’
knowledge bearing and knowledge creating capacities, insights from
industrial and organizational psychology need to be brought to bear to
connect those important disciplines’ research with corporate governance and employment compensation design. Industrial and organizational psychology mechanisms to create high performance workplaces
and enhance the justice climates within rms are well-understood in
those disciplines, and the productivity gains of various mechanisms
supported by extensive empirical evidence from both eld and laboratory studies. This knowledge has been poorly integrated into corporate
governance thinking on executive compensation, however, and as such
provides fertile ground for interdisciplinary advance.
5
6

See the interdisciplinary research program at www.sfb597.uni-bremen.de.
For an early, provocative approach, see Bernard de Mandeville, The Fable of the Bees,
or Private Vices, Public Bene ts (1714).
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Finally, the capital market interventions of pension funds, and the
duciary duties of pension fund trustees, need further research and
careful policy consideration given the importance of these collective
welfare institutions to the health of both societies and capital markets.
As Chapters 9, 13 and 20 explore, pension funds of various kinds (public, private and/or labor-oriented) have become key market actors, owning large swathes of the market and becoming invested in every asset
class and type of nancial transaction. Given their long-term promises
to bene ciaries they ought to be the ultimate patient capitalists. Decades
of under-funding by political actors have created acute short-term pressures, however. Moreover, pension funds interact with an entire supply
chain of advisors and asset managers whose incentives may not, and
often do not, align with the interests of the ultimate bene ciaries. Thus
many funds have become anything but patient capitalists. How this
situation could be addressed requires a fundamental re-evaluation of
the nature of funds’ duciary duties, recognizing that funds own the
whole market and thus need to be concerned with the health of the
whole market and the societies in which they are embedded. Moreover
the problems associated with the funds’ investment supply chain are
well understood, as Chapter 20 discusses. It is time to consider in more
detail policy solutions to address those problems. As with each of the
topics discussed here, the present collection suggests that such solutions ought to be pursued through a close dialogue between “theory”
and “practice.”

